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Abstract 
Poor information flows hamper coordination, potentially leading to suboptimal decisions in 
health care. We examine the effects of a nationwide policy of information integration on the 
quality of prescribing. We use the rollout of an electronic prescribing system in Finland and 
prescription-level administrative data. We find no effect on the probability of co-prescribing 
harmful drug combinations in urban regions. In rural regions, this probability reduces substan-
tially, by 35 percent. The effect is driven by prescriptions from unspecialized physicians and from 
multiple physicians. Improving the local information environment thus enhances coordination 
and narrows differences in the quality of prescribing. 
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1 Introduction 
The essential purpose of organizations is to improve the coordination of interdependent decisions 
to achieve more desirable outcomes (Gibbons and Roberts 2012). The challenge for improving 
coordination is that information is incomplete and dispersed among decision makers (Hayek 1945). 
Health care is a prominent example: a patient’s care delivery is spread across multiple organizations 
and physicians, and each physician has different knowledge of the patient’s health and medical 
history. The relevant medical information is costly for the physicians to search and imperfectly 
shared between them, for example because of incompatible health information systems. (Arrow 
1963; Cebul et al. 2008.) Critically, information integration systems offer policy tools to improve 
coordination by sharing the relevant information more easily within and across organizational 
boundaries. However, because large-scale implementation of such systems has been difficult and 
costly, there is only little empirical evidence of their effectiveness in achieving the goal of improved 
coordination. 
We analyze a public policy of health information integration between regional care providers. 
Our empirical setting is based on the rollout of a nationwide electronic prescribing (e-prescribing) 
system across all the municipalities in Finland over a period of four years. In comparison to 
providers’ pre-existing incompatible health information systems, e-prescribing systems provide more 
comprehensive information on prescriptions across multiple physicians involved in a patient’s care. 
We estimate the effects of the policy of information integration on the quality of prescribing, 
which we measure by using comprehensive administrative data on (interacting) prescriptions for 
one of the most common and harmful combinations of drugs: blood thinners and anti-inflammatory 
drugs (NSAIDs) such as ibuprofen and aspirin (Malone et al. 2005b; Roughead et al. 2010; Rikala 
et al. 2015). The data allow us to analyze the effects across different types of regions and physicians, 
highlighting the underlying mechanisms through which the policy acts. The data also identify 
interacting prescriptions obtained from multiple physicians over time, allowing us to provide direct 
evidence of the effects in terms of coordination. 
The economic burden of coordination failures is high in health care. For example, in the U.S., 
the total annual cost of waste due to failures in care coordination has been estimated at between 
$27.2 and $78.2 billion (Shrank et al. 2019). Prescriptions for harmful drug combinations are a clear 
consequence of coordination failure. The prevalence of harmful drug combinations has increased in 
recent decades and is particularly high among individuals with multiple chronic diseases and older 
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patients (Mallet et al. 2007; Qato et al. 2016). 
Besides providing a large-scale quasi-experiment, our empirical setting has other major ad-
vantages for analyzing the effects of information integration policies. Blood thinners, warfarin in 
particular, are widely prescribed to prevent serious conditions such as strokes and heart attacks 
(Kirley et al. 2012; Fimea and Kela 2019). The medical guidelines, however, clearly caution against 
combining warfarin with NSAIDs because of the increased risk of major bleeding complications 
(Lindh et al. 2014; Malone et al. 2005a). We expect medical information and better coordination 
to be crucial in avoiding prescriptions for such drug combinations. 
Our administrative data contain 1.7 million prescriptions for over 250,000 warfarin patients 
in the period 2007–2014. Despite there being well-established guidelines, the co-prescribing of 
warfarin and NSAIDs was fairly common before the adoption of e-prescribing in our data.1 The 
regional share of these interacting prescriptions was 6 percent on average in the pre-adoption period, 
with substantial variation across municipalities (between 2 and 19 percent). The worst-performing 
municipalities, as measured by the fourth quartile of the regional interaction share, were typically 
rural (80 percent of all cases). 
Using our prescription-level data, we find that information integration through e-prescribing 
differentially impacts the quality of prescribing across municipalities. There is no statistically 
significant effect on the probability of co-prescribing warfarin with NSAIDs in urban municipalities; 
the confidence intervals of our baseline difference-in-differences (DiD) models rule out effects larger 
than 9 percent compared to the mean. However, in rural municipalities, the measure of low-quality 
prescribing reduces substantially, by approximately 35 percent. Thus, the estimated benefits of 
information integration are much larger in rural than in urban municipalities, possibly because of 
pre-existing regional differences in the local information environment or physician expertise. 
We find that the improvements in rural prescribing patterns are driven by unspecialized physi-
cians (general practitioners). They supply a disproportionate amount of prescriptions in rural 
municipalities and have fewer years of education than specialized physicians.2 E-prescribing may 
reduce information frictions for these unspecialized physicians and narrow differences in physicians’ 
expertise or knowledge by integrating medical information between them. 
1For comparison, in a large U.S. prescription claims study 24 percent of warfarin patients received an NSAID 
during a two-year follow-up (Malone et al. 2005b). 
2In our data the share of prescriptions from unspecialized physicians is 46 percent in urban regions and 55 percent 
in rural municipalities. From an international perspective, there is a greater proportion of generalists (and fewer 
specialists) in rural than in urban areas (Rabinowitz and Paynter 2002), suggesting regional differences in medical 
expertise. 
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Consistent with improved coordination between physicians, we find that the improvements 
in rural prescribing are also driven by interacting prescriptions from different physicians, rather 
than from the same physician. However, the resulting direct health benefits seem to be marginal: 
using additional administrative data, we find no evidence of a reduction in severe and relatively 
rare bleeding complications among warfarin patients as a result of e-prescribing. Based on our 
findings, we conclude that the improvements in the physicians’ information environment facilitate 
coordination and reduce some (but not all) gaps in the quality of prescribing. 
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on coordination by studying the effects of 
a nationwide policy of information integration. Previous literature has analyzed monetary in-
centives and various organizational or management structures (e.g. hospital-physician integration, 
accountable care organizations (ACOs), hospitalists) as potential means for improving coordination 
(Gaynor et al. 2004; Cebul et al. 2008; Meltzer and Chung 2010). However, empirical work ex-
amining other fundamental components such as those affecting information is very limited (Bloom 
et al. 2014). Our results support the view that information integration improves coordination and 
mitigates the harms of fragmentation in health care (Cebul et al. 2008; Elhauge 2010). 
Our results complement prior work on fragmented care delivery and related patient outcomes 
(Skinner et al. 2006; Agha et al. 2019). The findings are also broadly consistent with prior work 
on the determinants of physician practice style (e.g. education or information) within and across 
geographic regions (Epstein et al. 2016; Molitor 2018; Schnell and Currie 2018; Cutler et al. 2019). 
We also contribute to the literature analyzing how information technology affects patient health 
(e.g. McCullough et al. 2010; Miller and Tucker 2011; Agha 2014; McCullough et al. 2016; Böcker-
man et al. 2019). The paper closest to ours is McCullough et al. (2016), who examine the effects of 
health information technology on mortality for the most complex patients whose diagnoses require 
cross-specialty care coordination. In contrast to their work, we explicitly analyze potential im-
provements in physicians’ coordination or treatment choices, which are the determinants of patient 
health and one of the key objectives of health information technology. 
Much of the evidence is from the U.S., where providers’ incompatible, non-standardized health 
information systems integrate information locally, within a hospital. However, in a fragmented 
health care delivery system, high-quality care requires smooth information flows between different 
providers and organizations (Cebul et al. 2008). By analyzing a nationwide information integration, 
we provide evidence on the effectiveness of a broader policy intervention to improve the quality 
of health care than local policy designs. Our study also complements prior research on local 
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interventions (randomized controlled trials) aiming to reduce medication errors (Khalil et al. 2017). 
2 Setting 
2.1 Organizational Fragmentation and Coordination Failures in the Finnish Health 
Care System 
Finland has a decentralized single-payer health care system, in which decisions related to the 
organization and provision of health care are moved closer to the users of health services than in a 
centralized system. By law, primary heath care is organized by municipalities (N = 304 in 2014) 
and specialized health care is organized by hospital districts (N = 20). Furthermore, physicians 
are usually employed by the public sector (FMA 2016), where they have weaker financial incentives 
to influence prescribing than in the private sector. The sectors providing complementary private 
and employer-sponsored occupational health care services are fairly small due to the provision of 
universal public health care services (Vuorenkoski et al. 2008; THL 2019).3 Because service delivery 
and decisions related to organization is distributed across distinct care providers and regions, the 
system are highly fragmented. Fragmentation makes transmission of relevant medical information 
between providers crucial. 
Before e-prescribing, health information systems were incompatible and operated within a region 
or even single health care unit. The platforms (electronic medical records, EMRs) were produced 
by private companies for different health care providers (Keskimäki et al. 2019). Also, the devel-
opment of health information systems was uncoordinated at the national level (Teperi et al. 2009). 
The local and separate EMR systems generally contained information on a patient’s prescription 
history as it was collected by the individual health care provider or unit, and this information was 
not available in a uniform and transferable electronic format at the national level. The transfer of 
prescription information was not possible even between providers that had the same EMR platform. 
Similarly, prescription information did not transfer between pharmacies because of their incompat-
ible information systems.4 Moreover, a lack of information integration made it more difficult to 
establish care coordination and to avoid prescriptions for harmful combinations of drugs.5 
3In 2014, private health care covered by the National Health Insurance Scheme accounted for 6 percent and 
occupational health care for 4 percent of total health care costs (THL 2019). 
4The pharmacy market is also fragmented because regulation prohibits pharmacy chains and all pharmacies are 
operated by private providers. 
5This occurred despite the fact that physicians and pharmacies had access to a drug interaction database (IN-
XBASE). INXBASE was/is integrated with many EMR and pharmacy platforms and automatically warns about 
drug interactions using information on a patient’s prescriptions in that local platform. However, INXBASE is not 
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2.2 E-prescribing: Information Integration and Quality of Prescribing 
E-prescribing is a widely used, but understudied health information technology for digitizing 
prescriptions and transfer of information on these across providers. In addition to Finland, e-
prescribing systems have been adopted in many other European countries, the U.S., Australia, 
and Canada, among others, in the recent decade. Next, we describe the key mechanisms through 
which e-prescribing affects the quality of prescribing, as measured by prescriptions for harmful drug 
combinations. 
The central goal of implementing an integrated e-prescribing system is to enhance the quality 
of prescribing by improving coordination and information flows across multiple physicians involved 
in a patient’s care (Bell and Friedman 2005). In contrast to providers’ pre-existing incompatible 
health information systems, e-prescribing systems provide physicians (and pharmacies) access to a 
patient’s complete e-prescription history; this information is illustrated in online Appendix Figure 
A1 from the Finnish health care provider setting. Better availability of prescription information 
reduces the chance that one physician will not know about prescriptions from another physician. 
Therefore, the system can reduce prescriptions for harmful drug combinations, especially when 
they are written by different physicians.6 Similarly, by integrating prescription information across 
pharmacies, the system can reduce the purchasing of harmful combinations of drugs from multiple 
pharmacies. 
Our earlier work (Böckerman et al. 2019) focuses on another central goal of e-prescribing: 
improvements in the efficiency of the prescribing process through digital generation and transfer 
of a patient’s prescriptions between physicians and pharmacies. Compared to traditional paper 
prescriptions, e-prescribing reduces the hassle and time costs of renewing and filling prescriptions, 
also eliminating lost prescriptions. E-prescribing can thus increase prescription drug use. This 
in turn can increase the use of harmful drug combinations. Taken together, the net effect of e-
prescribing (through information integration and digitization of prescriptions) on the quality of 
prescribing is ambiguous. 
integrated with the e-prescribing system and does not create flags about possible interacting prescriptions. 
6E-prescribing may also reduce or eliminate the risks of misinterpretation and illegal falsification of handwritten 
paper prescriptions. 
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2.3 Adoption of the Nationwide E-prescribing System 
We evaluate a large-scale public policy change: the adoption of the nationwide e-prescribing sys-
tem, including all e-prescriptions and their dispensing records, and covering both public and private 
health care providers. The common standards and interoperability of the fully integrated nation-
wide system enable access to prescriptions for all physicians and pharmacies involved in a patient’s 
care. This access, however, requires a patient’s permission. 
We focus on the staggered adoption of e-prescribing by municipalities in (public) primary care for 
three reasons. First, primary care physicians write most prescriptions, especially for warfarin and 
NSAIDs (Lindh et al. 2014). Second, in Section 4, we document a sharp increase in the take-up rate 
of e-prescriptions by physicians and their warfarin patients after the patients’ municipality adopted 
e-prescribing. Third, there is substantial and plausibly exogenous regional heterogeneity in the 
adoption time of the e-prescribing system. As explained in Böckerman et al. (2019), the adoption 
time was determined by technical difficulties in the integration of the e-prescribing system with the 
pre-existing information technology systems in health care units and pharmacies, rather than by 
trends in prescribing and health outcomes. 
Figure 1 documents the staggered rollout of the e-prescribing system across municipalities over 
the period 2010-2014.7 The figure shows the adoption time at the quarter-level and we also use this 
level of precision in our estimations. By the first quarter of 2013, all municipalities had adopted the 
new system. The figure also indicates some geographical clustering of the reform. Municipalities 
are affiliated with one of the hospital districts, which coordinate some of their activities. However, 
the clustering is not a threat for identification of the effects, and there is also relevant variation for 
identification within hospital districts. 
7Adoption of the system became mandatory in public health care units by 2014 and in private health care units 
by 2015. Very small private units issuing less than 5,000 prescriptions annually were excepted, and had the system 
by 2017. 
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         Year−qtr    N    Cum. population−%
2010 Q2   1      0.03
2011 Q2   10    0.06
2011 Q3   1      0.06
2011 Q4   23    0.12
2012 Q1   50    0.25
2012 Q2   50    0.45
2012 Q3   7      0.47
2012 Q4   61    0.80
2013 Q1   101  1.00
Figure 1: Staggered Adoption of E-prescribing in Municipalities 
Note: This figure plots the year-quarter when e-prescribing was adopted by a municipality in (public) primary care. 
The figure also shows the number of municipalities and the cumulative population share by the period of adoption. 
Source: National Institute for Health and Welfare, and Statistics Finland: Population Statistics 
2.4 Market Description 
We study the nationwide e-prescribing system as a policy tool for information integration to improve 
provider coordination and the quality of prescribing. Our measure of the quality of prescribing is 
one of the most common and harmful combinations of drugs in primary care settings (Andersson 
et al. 2018): warfarin (international brand names Coumadin, Marevan, among others) and anti-
inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) such as aspirin and ibuprofen. 
Warfarin is one of the most commonly prescribed anticoagulants or blood thinners. It is an 
effective treatment for blood clots, which can cause serious health problems such as heart attacks 
and strokes (Beckman et al. 2010). In Finland, warfarin expenditures totaled approximately 3 
million euros and 13 defined daily doses per 1,000 inhabitants per day in 2018 (Fimea and Kela 
2019). For comparison, in the U.S., approximately 8–9 million prescriptions for warfarin are written 
per quarter and the total quarterly expenditures were approximately 144 million dollars in 2011/Q4 
(Kirley et al. 2012). 
Despite the proved effectiveness of warfarin, making safe, clinically appropriate prescribing 
decisions for warfarin patients is challenging. It has clinically significant, potentially dangerous, 
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but preventable interactions with other medications, especially with NSAIDs. Although NSAIDs 
are available over the counter (OTC) in lower dosages in most countries, these drugs are also 
widely prescribed to treat conditions such as acute or chronic pain and inflammation.8 As warfarin 
and NSAIDs have blood-thinning effects and can cause bleeding (hemorrhage), combinations of 
them increase the risk of bleeding even more. As a result, a patient may experience, for example, 
continuous bleeding, especially in the gastrointestinal tract (Battistella et al. 2005), which can 
result in hospitalization and even death. 
Against this institutional background, we turn next to documenting significant shortcomings 
and variations in provider coordination and the quality of prescribing using comprehensive admin-
istrative datasets on warfarin (and NSAID) patients in Finland. 
3 Administrative Datasets 
We analyze prescriptions for harmful drug combinations, which is our measure of the quality of 
prescribing and an outcome of coordination and information failures. We focus on combinations of 
warfarin and NSAIDs because they are relatively common and their direct health harms (bleeding 
complications) are well-documented and clinically significant (Section 2.4). 
We primarily use administrative data on warfarin patients and their NSAID prescriptions over 
the period 2007–2014. We measure their bleeding complications using additional administrative 
data on discharges in specialized health care. Obviously, these complications are only one subset of 
health outcomes. Also, the main results for warfarin patients do not necessarily generalize to users 
of other prescription drugs or to the Finnish population. 
Our sample construction covering warfarin patients improves statistical power, since we focus 
on prescriptions for those who may have harmful drug combinations and are thus targeted by the 
e-prescribing policy.9 We examine separately the extensive margin of prescription drug use and 
return to the issues more closely in Section 5.3. Next we provide an overview of the datasets, 
sample construction and key variables. 
Prescription Data—The Prescription Data are from the Social Insurance Institution of Fin-
land. The data record the universe of warfarin and NSAID prescriptions that are filled at Finnish 
8In Finland, expenditures for NSAIDs totaled approximately 44 million euros and there were 1.4 million recipients 
of reimbursement for prescription drugs under the NHI in 2018 (Fimea and Kela 2019). 
9The sample construction is also fairly similar to those used in related work on drug interactions (Holbrook et al. 
2005; Rikala et al. 2015). 
8 
pharmacies and are covered by the National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme over the period 2007– 
2014.10 The key advantage of our comprehensive register-based data is that we can follow patients 
over time, even if they switch physicians, providers or employers. Using these data, we construct 
our main sample of patients, who filled at least one warfarin prescription during the observation 
period. This sample construction leads to a relatively homogeneous group of patients, who are 
mostly elderly (Section 3.1). For warfarin patients, we include the complete records of all their 
NSAID prescriptions throughout the years. We also confirm that our main results are robust to 
using an alternative sample, including all NSAID patients in the Prescription Data. The unit of 
observation is a prescription. 
The data record the coded patient identifier, the patient’s date of birth and death, and the 
municipality of residence. We use the 2013 municipality classification because Finland experienced 
a substantial number of municipal mergers in the years in the data (but not in 2014). Using the 
municipality of residence, we link the Prescription Data to additional data on the municipality’s 
official statistical group from Statistics Finland; we thus identify patients in urban, semi-urban 
and rural municipalities.11 We use two aggregated municipality groups in our analysis: urban (or 
semi-urban) and rural. See online Appendix Figure A2 for the map of municipalities by group. 
We group together urban and semi-urban municipalities (and call them urban municipalities for 
brevity) because there is no apparent heterogeneity in the main effects of e-prescribing between 
these two groups (Section 5). 
The Prescription Data also record the physician identifier, the date of prescribing, the e-
prescribing status, the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) code of the prescription, and 
the number of defined daily doses (DDD) of the prescription.12 The WHO’s defined daily dose is 
a widely used international metric, defined as the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a 
drug used for its main indication in adults. In our data, a very small fraction of prescriptions, less 
than one percent, is missing this information, and we drop these observations. Additionally, our 
data record unique identifiers for prescribing physicians, as well as their specialties and the date of 
10The original data record all purchases related to a prescription (the items of the prescription may be purchased 
on multiple occasions). Here we rather use prescription-level data and identify prescriptions based on the patient and 
physician identifier, active ingredient, and the date of prescribing. 
11Statistics Finland defines rural municipalities as including those in which less than 60 percent of the population 
live in urban settlements and in which the population of the largest urban settlement is less than 15,000 individuals; 
and those in which at least 60 percent but less than 90 percent of the population live in urban settlements and in 
which the population of the largest settlement is less than 4,000 individuals. All other municipalities are classified as 
urban or semi-urban. 
12Our data may include a limited number of prescriptions issued by nurses, who have been able to administer 
drugs in Finland since 2012. However, the total number of prescriptions written by nurses is very small during our 
observation period, only 3,310 prescriptions in 2013 (Virta 2014). 
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specialization. 
Our measure of the quality of prescribing is an indicator for co-prescribing potentially harmful 
combinations of warfarin and NSAID medications. See online Appendix A.1 for the ATC codes. 
To construct the measure, we take advantage of the amount of defined daily doses a patient filled 
from each prescription and the date of prescribing. We define and assume that one (theoretically) 
defined daily dose corresponds to one (actual) day of drug consumption. If the previous prescrip-
tion is not fully consumed before the current prescription is issued, we flag the current prescription 
as an interacting prescription. Also, a necessary condition for a harmful interaction is that the 
previous prescription is for warfarin and the current prescription is for NSAID, or vice versa. 13 In 
addition to the quality of prescribing, we measure the intensive and extensive margins of warfarin 
and NSAID use, as described in Section 5.3. 
Discharge Data—The Discharge Data are from the the National Institute for Health and Wel-
fare. The data contain comprehensive information on Finnish public inpatient and outpatient 
specialized health care discharges in 2007–2014. The deidentified data record coded patient identi-
fiers, the patient’s diagnoses (ICD-10 coding), the date of discharge, and the patient’s municipality 
of residence. Using the unique coded patient identifiers, we link the Discharge Data to the Pre-
scription Data for the population of interest (warfarin patients). 
From the data, we construct a dummy variable that equals one if the patient has a gastroin-
testinal hemorrhage (bleeding) diagnosis in specialized health care during a 3-month period. To 
calculate this outcome, we aggregate the data into a balanced panel form in which observations are 
at the patient-quarter-level. See online Appendix A.1 for the ICD-10 codes. 
E-prescribing Adoption Data—Our analysis uses data on the dates of the adoption of e-prescribing 
by municipalities from the National Institute for Health and Welfare. We link the data on regional 
adoption dates to our other two datasets (Prescription Data and aggregated Discharge Data) by 
the patient’s municipality of residence.14 Because the aggregated disharge data are at the patient-
quarter level, we consider the adoption of e-prescribing within the period of 3 months. 
13We compare the current prescription to all the patient’s previous prescriptions rather than only to the previous 
one. This is important, because elderly patients have typically several overlapping and potentially interacting pre-
scriptions. In constructing the interaction indicator, we take into account (unsual) cases where warfarin and NSAIDs 
are prescribed at the same time. 
14A patient typically chooses a public health care unit in his/her municipality of residence. For this reason, the 
municipality of residence also serves as a good proxy for the location of the prescribing physician. 
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Figure 2: Average Interaction Probability in Municipalities 
Notes: This figure plots the regional variation in the average probability of co-prescribing interacting drugs (NSAIDs) 
for warfarin patients by their municipality of residence in the pre-adoption period 2007-2009 (N = 191, 614 patients). 
3.1 Descriptive Evidence 
Consistent with prior research in other settings (Zhang et al. 2011), we find substantial geographical 
variation in the quality of prescribing for warfarin patients in the pre-adoption period 2007–2009: 
the share of their interacting warfarin and NSAID prescriptions varies between 2 and 19 percent 
across municipalities. The average municipality has an interaction share of 8 percent for warfarin 
patients, with a standard deviation of 3 percent. 
Table 1 shows that if we divide municipalities into quartiles by the regional interaction share, 
80 percent of the worst performing regions (quartile 4) are rural. This stylized fact is further 
highlighted in Figure 3, which plots the histograms of the regional interaction share for rural and 
urban municipalities. Overall, these findings show evidence that coordination and information 
failures in prescribing were prominent in rural regions before e-prescribing. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics separately for patients in urban and rural regions in 
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Figure 3: Average Interaction Probability in Urban and Rural Municipalities 
Notes: The histograms in this figure plot the regional variation in the average probability of co-prescribing interacting 
drugs (NSAIDs) for warfarin patients by their municipality of residence and municipality group (rural or urban) in 
the pre-adoption period 2007-2009. 
Table 1: Regional Variation in Interaction Probability, by Quantile 
Quantile Mean Min Max SD N Share of 
rural areas 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0.048 
0.066 
0.079 
0.112 
0.019 
0.059 
0.072 
0.089 
0.059 
0.072 
0.088 
0.188 
0.010 
0.004 
0.005 
0.022 
76 
75 
77 
76 
0.632 
0.413 
0.558 
0.803 
Total 0.076 0.019 0.188 0.027 304 0.602 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the average probability 
of co-prescribing interacting drugs (NSAIDs) for warfarin patients by their 
municipality of residence in the pre-adoption period 2007-2009. The table 
also reports the share of rural regions by the quantile of this regional 
interaction probability. 
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the pre-adoption period, using the prescription-level data. Panel A shows that approximately 17 
percent of warfarin patients were using interacting drugs (NSAIDs) in rural regions, and this share 
is 1 percentage point (8 percent) higher than for patients in urban regions. At the prescription 
level, the mean values of the probability of co-prescribing these interacting drugs were, however, 
fairly similar between these two regions (8 and 7 percent, respectively), but the corresponding 
standard deviations are very large (27 and 26 percent). Our findings on the fairly high rates of 
interacting prescriptions are consistent with prior research using Finnish data covering warfarin 
patients (Rikala et al. 2015). 
Panel B shows only little difference in warfarin use, but there was some difference in NSAID use 
between patients in urban and rural regions. The average number of defined daily doses of NSAIDs 
per patient was 59 in rural regions, which was 16 percent higher than in urban regions. Moreover, 
as the data are constructed using warfarin users, warfarin use per patient was much higher than 
that of NSAIDs. 
Panel C shows a striking regional variation in the supply of warfarin and NSAID prescriptions 
by physician specialty. In rural regions, unspecialized physicians supplied a much larger share of 
prescriptions compared to rural regions (55 versus 46 percent, respectively).15 Lack of access to 
specialists in rural regions limits the provision of services, but potentially also the opportunities for 
unspecialized physicians to consult specialists. 
Panel C also reveals that disrupted treatment relationships are common in Finland: the prob-
ability of getting a prescription from a different physician than last time was 53 percent in rural 
regions and 52 percent in urban regions. The ratio of unique physicians to patients was, however, 
much larger in rural regions (0.25) compared to urban regions (0.16). 
Warfarin use, and especially its combination with NSAIDs, increases the risk of bleeding (Section 
2.4). Panel D shows that the share of patients with a hemorrhage (bleeding) diagnosis was 7 
percent in rural regions, which was only 6 percent higher than in urban regions. Bleeding can be 
particularly harmful, even lethal, for older patients; in fact, the panel also shows that warfarin 
users were typically elderly, approximately 70-years-old on average16 and their mortality was high, 
approximately 10 percent. 
Finally, the number of physicians per municipality was much smaller in rural than in urban 
15Generally in Finland, physicians without a specialization (also called unspecialized physicians) are licensed physi-
cians with a Licentiate’s degree, which is a degree below a Doctoral degree and above a Master’s degree. Physicians 
with a specialization are usually medical doctors also with a Doctoral degree. 
16This fact is further highlighted in online Appendix Figure A3, which plots the histogram of the age of warfarin 
users. 
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municipalities (35 versus 135). The local networks of physicians may have affected information 
sharing and prescribing patterns, especially before nationwide information integration through e-
prescribing. 
14 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Pre-Adoption Period 2007–2009 
Urban Rural 
Mean Q10 Q90 SD Mean Q10 Q90 SD 
Panel A. Quality of prescribing 
Share of patients with an interaction 
Interaction probability 
Any warfarin-NSAID interaction 
NSAID on top of warfarin 
Warfarin on top of NSAID 
Overlapping days, 
conditional on interaction 
0.154 
0.070 
0.042 
0.028 
38.821 8.000 80.000 
0.255 
0.200 
0.166 
36.467 
0.167 
0.080 
0.050 
0.031 
39.086 8.000 80.000 
0.272 
0.218 
0.172 
36.478 
Panel B. Utilization 
Warfarin DDDs per patient 
Warfarin Rx per patient 
NSAID DDDs per patient 
NSAID Rx per patient 
390.705 
2.858 
51.092 
0.994 
66.660 
1.000 
0.000 
0.000 
799.920 
5.000 
134.000 
3.000 
292.427 
1.579 
145.929 
1.966 
382.999 
2.853 
59.056 
1.105 
66.660 
1.000 
0.000 
0.000 
799.920 
5.000 
164.000 
3.000 
283.287 
1.623 
163.520 
2.229 
Panel C. Physician variables 
Share of prescriptions by specialty 
Unspecialized 
General medicine 
Internal medicine 
Different prescriber 
0.458 
0.205 
0.059 
0.515 0.500 
0.548 
0.214 
0.037 
0.531 0.499 
Panel D. Other patient variables 
Age (on the date of prescribing) 
Share of patients who die 
Share of patients with 
a Hemorrhage diagnosis 
70.666 
0.101 
0.067 
53.000 85.000 13.421 72.327 
0.114 
0.071 
56.000 86.000 12.177 
N N 
Observations (prescriptions) 
Patients 
Physicians 
Municipalities 
382,823 
99,380 
16,390 
121 
101,424 
25,623 
6,357 
183 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for warfarin patients in the pre-adoption period 2007-2009. The variables are 
calculated from the prescription-level data, including both warfarin and NSAID prescriptions for these patients. The only exception 
is “Share of patients with a hemorrhage diagnosis” in Panel D, which is from the Discharge Data. In Panel A, “Probability of 
any warfarin-NSAID interaction” depicts the probability of this interaction (drug combination), resulting from NSAIDs (warfarin) 
prescribed on top of the existing warfarin (NSAID) prescriptions. “Share of patients with an interaction” shows the share of 
patients with a warfarin-NSAID interaction. 
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4 Econometric Approach 
We use the staggered adoption of the nationwide e-prescribing system across municipalities and 
over four years to estimate the effects on our measure of the quality of prescribing for patient i in 
municipality m in period t, yimt (Section 3). We estimate the effects on average and separately for 
each municipality group (urban or rural). Specifically, we estimate the following parametric event 
study specification, using the prescription-level data: 
8X 0 
yimt = δτ Dτ,mt + Ximtβ + αm + γt + imt, (1) 
τ =−8 
where Dτ,mt indicates the period relative to the adoption period of e-prescribing in municipality 
m. Thus, the parameter vector of interest, δ, measures the changes in the outcome around the e-
prescribing adoption in municipality m. We omit the first leading period to the adoption (τ = −1). 
Thus, the other δτ parameters are normalized relative to this period. Also, D−8,mt (D8,mt) equals 
one when the relative period is eight or more periods before (after) adoption. We include in the 
model the full set of the municipality fixed effects, αm, which absorb any differences between 
municipalities that do not change over time; time fixed effects γt, which capture time-varying 
national-level shocks that may affect the outcome; and controls for patient-specific covariates, 
Ximt, which include age and the square of age. We also report the results for a specification in 
which we replace municipality fixed effects, αm, with patient fixed effects, ηi. This specification uses 
within-patient variation in identification and controls for unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity 
across patients such as their gender. To allow for within-municipality correlation in patients’ 
unobservables, we cluster standard errors at the municipality level.17 
To summarize the event study estimates δτ as short- and long-run point estimates, we also 
estimate the following DiD model: 
0 
yimt = ρ1SR + ρ2LR + Ximtβ + αm + γt + imt. (2) 
Here ρ1 and ρ2 denote the short-run and long-run point estimates, respectively. We define the short 
run as the first three quarters after the e-prescribing adoption and the long run as the subsequent 
remaining quarters. 
Because of the staggered adoption of e-prescribing, the later-treated units use already-treated 
17The number of clusters (municipalities) is 304. 
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units as controls in estimation. Goodman-Bacon (2018) shows that the treatment effect estimated 
by the two-way fixed effects DiD estimator (the so-called pooled DiD estimator) is the weighted 
average of all possible two-group, two-period treatment effects. He shows that if the treatment 
effect varies over time, negative weights could arise for later-treated units, potentially biasing 
the treatment effect estimate. We present robustness checks to address these concerns in online 
Appendix Section B and conclude that negative weighting is not an issue in our setting. 
The take-up of e-prescriptions by physicians and their patients was voluntary during the ob-
servation period. This implies that the parameters of interest (δτ for τ ≥ 0, ρ1, ρ2) are the 
intention-to-treat (ITT) effects of e-prescribing. Figure 4 shows the take-up rate of e-prescriptions 
for warfarin patients around the adoption of e-prescribing by their municipality of residence (in pri-
mary care). The take-up rate of e-prescriptions increases sharply in the adoption period (quarter) 
and continues to increase gradually over time on average. One year after adoption approximately 
60 percent of prescriptions are issued electronically on average. The take-up rate is only slightly 
higher for rural than urban patients after the adoption. A marginally higher take-up rate for rural 
patients may result from the fact that their prescriptions are more frequently obtained from primary 
care, as opposed to specialized health care (Section 3.1). This observation is further highlighted 
in Online Appendix Figure A5, which shows a higher take-up rate after adoption for patients who 
get their prescriptions from nonspecialists or specialists in general medicine than from internists. 
Overall, these findings show that our results for the adoption of e-prescribing are not driven by low 
take-up rates and also provide additional support for our empirical approach, which is based on 
the adoption of the technology by municipalities in primary care. 
5 Results 
5.1 Quality of Prescribing: Harmful Drug Combinations 
Average Effects and Regional Heterogeneity.—Information integration can improve coordination, 
especially in settings in which for some reason information flows between physicians are being ham-
pered. Geographical dispersion (and lack) of information is one example of this. We begin our 
analysis by presenting the main results from estimating the effects of e-prescribing on the proba-
bility of a warfarin-NSAID interaction on average and by municipality group (urban/semiurban or 
rural), using the prescription-level data.18 Our regional heterogeneity analysis is motivated by the 
18Our classification of urban includes both urban and semiurban municipalities because the main effects of e-
prescribing are very similar in these two municipality groups, as shown in online Appendix Figure A6. 
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Figure 4: Take-up Rate of E-prescriptions, by Municipality Group 
Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
from warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals to one if the prescription (warfarin or NSAID) 
is an e-prescription. Each line is plotted from a separate regression. 
descriptive evidence, which suggests that coordination and information failures are more prominent 
in rural than urban regions (Section 3.1).19 
Figure 5 plots the δτ coefficients and their confidence intervals from estimating the event study 
specification in Equation (1). Panel A shows that e-prescribing has a statistically insignificant 
effect on the interaction probability on average. The average effects are driven by prescriptions 
in urban/semiurban municipalities, as shown in Panel B. The corresponding DiD estimates from 
Equation (2) are very close to zero and precisely estimated (column 1 of Table 3). In contrast, Panel 
C of the figure shows a statistically significant and large decrease in the interaction probability in 
rural regions after e-prescribing. The magnitude of the corresponding long-run point estimate is -36 
percent compared to the mean (Table 3). The decrease is gradual, coinciding with the increasing 
take-up rate of e-prescribing technology over time. Overall, the figure does not reveal clear pre-
trends, supporting the key identification assumption of our empirical specification. 
In our setting, information integration can affect the drug combination risk for all-aged patients. 
On the one hand, the medical literature has documented that the concurrent use of multiple med-
ications is most common among elderly patients (Mallet et al. 2007). Thus, elderly patients are at 
19Online Appendix Table A2 confirms that the largest effects occur in the worst-performing municipalities, as 
measured by the fourth quartile of the municipalities’ pre-adoption interaction rate. The vast majority (80 percent) 
of the worst-performing municipalities are rural (Section 5). 
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Table 3: Effects of E-Prescribing on Warfarin-NSAID Interaction Probability 
Hosp. distr. ATC No private All NSAID No dying 
Baseline Patient FE trend trend visits patients patients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A. All municipalities 
Short-run −0.002 −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.002 −0.002 −0.000 −0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Long-run −0.003 −0.004∗ −0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.000 −0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Mean outcome 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.010 0.046 
Observations 1,689,506 1,689,506 1,689,506 1,689,506 1,624,852 7,752,317 1,243,189 
Panel B. Urban municipalities 
Short-run 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Long-run 0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Mean outcome 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.043 0.009 0.045 
Observations 1,347,198 1,347,198 1,347,198 1,347,198 1,289,846 6,548,763 1,000,947 
Panel C. Rural municipalities 
Short-run −0.011∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Long-run −0.018∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Mean outcome 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.014 0.049 
Observations 342,308 342,308 342,308 342,308 335,006 1,203,554 242,242 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from the Difference-in-Differences regressions using the prescription-level data. The 
outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with another NSAID (warfarin) 
prescription. “Short-run” refers to the first year after adoption, and “Long-run” refers to all subsequent periods. Each panel-
column combination is estimated from a separate regression. All specifications include municipality fixed effects, time fixed 
effects, and age and age squared, except that column 2 replaces municipality fixed effects with patient fixed effects, column 3 adds 
hospital district specific time trends, and column 4 adds ATC-code specific time trends. Column 5 eliminates all prescriptions 
with a private physician visit from the regressions. Column 6 uses data on prescriptions for all patients who have at least one 
NSAID prescription, but not necessarily a warfarin prescription, as opposed to using the baseline sample that limits the data 
to prescriptions for patients who have at least one warfarin prescription over the period 2007–2014 (other columns). Column 7 
excludes all prescriptions for patients who die during the observation period of the data. The standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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Figure 5: Probability of Warfarin-NSAID Interaction, By Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data on 
warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with 
another NSAID (warfarin) prescription. The omitted period is −Q1 and thus the coefficient estimates are relative to 
this period. The controls include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, age and age squared. Panel A plots the 
results for the whole sample of municipalities, Panel B plots for urban and semi-urban municipalities, and Panel C 
plots for rural municipalities, according to the classification by Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
a much higher risk of getting prescriptions for harmful drug combinations. On the other hand, our 
Appendix Figure A3 shows that there are more NSAID prescriptions among non-elderly warfarin 
patients (age under 65). 
To study the potential age differences in more detail, we plot the long-run coefficients from the 
baseline specification, which is estimated separately for each municipality group and three differ-
ent age groups: below 65, between 65 and 75, and above 75 (Figure 6). For urban regions, the 
point estimates are again close to zero and precisely estimated across the three age groups. For 
rural regions, the largest long-run reduction occurs among patients aged under 65. For the other 
two age groups, the reduction is approximately three times smaller than for the non-elderly patients. 
Sensitivity Analyses.—To establish the robustness of our main findings, the remaining columns 
in Table 3 report the results from making various changes to the baseline specification. These 
changes include using patient fixed effects instead of municipality fixed effects (column 2); adding 
hospital district specific linear time trends (column 3); adding an extra linear time trend for in-
dividual ATC-codes or active ingredients (column 4); excluding all prescriptions with a visit to a 
private physician from the estimation sample, as we are investigating the adoption of e-prescribing 
in public primary care (column 5); including prescriptions for all patients who have at least one 
NSAID prescription, but not necessarily a warfarin prescription (column 6), as opposed to using 
the baseline sample that limits the data to prescriptions for warfarin patients; and including pre-
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Figure 6: Long-Run Point Estimates, by Age and Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the long-run coefficients from Difference-in-Differences regressions using the prescription-
level data on warfarin patients. Each coefficient is plotted from a separate regression. “Long-run” refers to all 
quarters after the first year of e-prescribing adoption. All regressions control for municipality fixed effects, time fixed 
effects, patient’s age, and square of age. The urban/semi-urban and rural classification is from Statistics Finland. 
The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
scriptions only for patients who do not die during the observation period, in order to confirm that 
nonrandom attrition caused by mortality does not bias the baseline estimates (column 7).20 The 
point estimates and their standard errors remain remarkably similar across all these specifications. 
Figures A8 and A9 plot the results of these robustness checks in the event study framework. 
When a harmful drug combination occurs, it may be easier for the patient to stop using NSAIDs 
than warfarin as the latter is an essential, even life-saving medication. Failing to find similar results 
when considering only one-way interactions where NSAID is prescribed on top of warfarin would 
cast doubt on the validity of our results. Online Appendix Figure A13 shows that the results for 
these one-way interactions are very similar to our main results for two-way interactions (warfarin 
on top of NSAIDs or the other way round). 
We additionally conduct several sensitivity tests regarding the measurement of the main out-
come variable. First, we artificially decrease (increase) the length of prescriptions in Panels A–C 
(D–F) of Figure A10. Second, we exclude all interactions that interact for less than 10 days (and 
20Mortality among warfarin patients is approximately 10 percent in both urban and rural regions (Section 3.1). If 
patients who have a higher probability of suffering from harmful drug interactions during the pre-adoption period 
are also more likely to die, attrition due to mortality would bias downwards the estimated impact of e-prescribing on 
the interaction probability. The specification in column 2 (with patient fixed effects) is an alternative approach to 
address this concern. 
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over 100 days) in Panels A–C (D–F) of Figure A11.21 Our baseline results are not sensitive to these 
changes in the model specification. In Figure A12 and Table A3 we confirm that our estimates 
are not sensitive to using patient-specific average prescribing intervals as an alternative proxy for 
prescription length. 
Placebo Regressions.—As a supplementary analysis, we estimate placebo regressions for the in-
teraction probability. For this purpose, we use an interaction between warfarin and benzodiazepines 
as an outcome. Benzodiazepines are widely used medications for treating anxiety and sleep disor-
ders (Olfson et al. 2015), and they do not have known harmful interactions with warfarin, according 
to the medical literature (Orme et al. 1972). Therefore, e-prescribing should not reduce warfarin-
benzodiazepine interactions. As expected, Figure A14 shows no statistically significant reduction 
in these interactions, supporting the validity of our earlier findings. 
5.2 Mechanisms Behind the Improvement in Quality of Prescribing 
Improvement in the Information Environment.—Next we turn to investigate the potential mecha-
nisms driving the improvement in the quality of prescribing in rural regions. We begin by assessing 
the role of physician expertise and medical education as well as changes in the treating physician. 
For the expertise, we consider the three most common types of medical specialties in our data: 
unspecialized, general medicine, and internal medicine. Compared to specialized physicians, un-
specialized physicians have less medical education.22 Similar to specialists of general medicine, 
unspecialized physicians are likely to work in primary care, in which patients are usually healthier 
than in specialized (hospital) care. 
Figure 7 presents the event studies for the three specialties in rural regions. Column 3 of online 
Appendix Table A4 shows the corresponding short- and long-run point estimates. Column 2 of the 
table shows that there are no statistically significant effects in urban regions. In rural regions, the 
interaction probability decreases substantially for unspecialized physicians, who write a dispropor-
tionate amount of prescriptions in those regions (Panel A). For specialists in general medicine the 
decrease is much smaller and statistically insignificant (Panel B). For internists, the event study 
estimates are also negative but more imprecisely estimated than for the other specialties (Panel C). 
Interestingly, internists have the highest probability of writing an interacting prescription, most 
21See online Appendix Figure A4 for the density of interaction days. 
22In Finland, unspecialized physicians have the basic medical education that lasts for a minimum of six years and 
leads to the degree of Licentiate of Medicine. Additional specialist education typically takes 5-6 years. 
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Figure 7: Probability of Warfarin-NSAID Interaction in Rural Municipalities, by Physician Spe-
ciality 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data on 
warfarin patients in rural municipalities. Panels A, B, and C plot the results for prescriptions written by unspecialized 
physicians, and physicians specialized in general medicine and internal medicine, respectively. See Figure 5 for more 
information on the specification of the model. 
likely because of the complexity of their patient population. Based on these analyses, we con-
clude that the improvements in the quality of prescribing in rural areas are driven by unspecialized 
physicians. Lack of specialization and relevant information may have limited their ability to detect 
harmful drug combinations before e-prescribing.23 
Coordination and Information Integration Between Physicians.—We proceed to look further 
into the mechanisms of information integration and coordination. E-prescribing should especially 
improve the quality of prescribing by improving a physician’s information on the medication choices 
of the patient’s previous physicians. To test this, we construct a binary outcome variable that 
equals one if the prescription interacts (overlaps) with the previous underlying prescription and 
the two prescriptions are from different physicians. Figure 8 plots the event study results in rural 
regions.24 For comparison, we present the results for the outcome that the same physician writes 
the interacting prescriptions. We also present the results on the baseline (overall) effect that equals 
the sum of the two decomposed effects. 
Figure 8 shows that the overall reduction in the interaction probability is predominantly driven 
by interacting prescriptions from different physicians, rather than from the same physician. The 
decrease for different physicians is statistically significantly larger in the short and long run than 
23Also, more highly educated patients may be better aware of potential dangers of interactions. As we do not 
observe the patient’s education or other socioeconomic background characteristics in the data, we do not investigate 
this issue further. 
24Figure A7 shows that the results do not differ from the baseline estimates in urban regions. 
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Figure 8: Probability of Warfarin-NSAID Interaction in Rural Municipalities, Different Versus 
Same Prescribing Physician 
Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
on warfarin patients in rural municipalities. The outcome labeled as “Total effect” is the baseline outcome and 
is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with another NSAID (warfarin) 
prescription. The outcome labeled as “Different physician” adds an additional condition to the baseline outcome that 
the interacting prescriptions are written by different physicians. The outcome labeled as “Same physician” adds an 
extra condition to the baseline outcome that the interacting prescriptions are written by the same physician. See 
Figure 5 for more information on the specification of the model. 
for the same physician (online Appendix Table A5). Note that in the table the coefficient esti-
mates for a different physician are estimated relative to the same physician. This finding suggests 
that e-prescribing provides critical information to physicians in settings with changing health care 
providers and mitigates coordination failures in the system. 
Information Integration Between Pharmacies.—Pharmacies also adopted the e-prescribing sys-
tem and, as a result, information flows between different pharmacies may have improved. We 
proceed similarly as above and decompose the main outcome to interactions where the patient fills 
the interacting prescriptions in different pharmacies versus the same pharmacy. Figure 9 shows the 
results from this decomposition in rural municipalities. The decrease in interactions comes almost 
entirely from prescriptions filled in the same pharmacy. Thus, information integration between 
pharmacies does not drive our main results. 
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Figure 9: Probability of Warfarin-NSAID Interaction in Rural Municipalities, Different Versus 
Same Pharmacy 
Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
on warfarin patients in rural municipalities. The outcome labeled as “Total effect” is the baseline outcome and 
is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with another NSAID (warfarin) 
prescription. The outcome labeled as “Different pharmacy” adds an additional condition to the baseline outcome 
that the interacting prescriptions are fully filled at different pharmacies. The outcome labeled as “Same pharmacy” 
adds an extra condition to the baseline outcome that the interacting prescriptions are (at least partly) filled at the 
same pharmacy. See Figure 5 for more information on the specification of the model. 
5.3 Quantity of Prescribing: Adjustment at Intensive And Extensive Margins 
We then analyze the effects on prescription drug use to get a broader picture of the effects of 
e-prescribing and of the underlying mechanisms such as changes in the patient population. E-
prescribing can either decrease (better monitoring) or increase prescription drug use (easier renewal 
and decreased hassle costs), see Section 2.2. If more drugs are being prescribed, there is a greater 
chance that there will be an interaction among the drugs. The effect is obviously the opposite if 
e-prescribing leads to less drugs being prescribed. 
We analyze the effects on the intensive and extensive margins of prescription drug use. The 
intensive margin (prescription size) is measured by the number of defined daily doses per prescrip-
tion. The extensive margin is measured by the total number of new and repeat prescriptions that 
a patient has in a given quarter. In the extensive margin analysis we aggregate the data to the 
patient-quarter-level balanced panel. 
We find that the size of warfarin prescriptions increases by 4 percent in urban regions and by 
6 percent in rural regions in the long run after e-prescribing, as shown in Figure 10 and Online 
Appendix Table A6. However, the effects are overestimated in the two municipality groups because 
the prescription size is smaller one quarter before the adoption of e-prescribing (−Q1) than in the 
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previous periods.25 We interpret this decrease to be consistent with anticipation effects, in which 
physicians wrote shorter warfarin prescriptions in −Q1 as they expected that patients would benefit 
from the new technology. However, because prescriptions were shorter, physicians had to renew 
more prescriptions in the next periods right after the adoption of e-prescribing. Consistent with 
this, we find that the number of a patient’s warfarin prescriptions increases by approximately 1 
percent in the short run after e-prescribing, but remains close to zero in the long run in the two 
municipality groups.26 
Figure 11 and Online Appendix Table A8 show no statistically significant effect on the intensive 
and extensive margins of NSAID use in urban regions. In rural regions physicians write smaller 
NSAID prescriptions after e-prescribing, but they do not increase the quarterly number of NSAID 
prescriptions for warfarin patients. 
E-prescribing could affect initial warfarin prescriptions, and thereby change the warfarin patient 
population. To evaluate this possibility, Online Appendix Table A10 shows the effects separately 
on the number of all and new warfarin prescriptions per municipality and quarter, using aggre-
gated data and population weights in the estimation. We find the point estimates to be small and 
imprecisely estimated, especially for the outcome of new warfarin use. However, for the quarterly 
number of warfarin prescriptions, the point estimates suggest a 3–4 percent increase in rural mu-
nicipalities. Overall, the extensive margin adjustments are much smaller compared to the main 
effects on harmful drug combinations. 
Theoretically, e-prescribing could change the composition of the patient population through 
the extensive margin adjustments. This poses a potential threat for the identification of the main 
effects using prescription-level data. For example, if warfarin users were less likely to need NSAIDs 
after e-prescribing, the coefficients of interest would reflect the change in the patient composition 
rather than the true effects of information on the interaction probability. Therefore, as an ad-
ditional check, we also estimate regressions for the total number of warfarin-NSAID interactions 
per municipality and quarter, as shown in Table A10. Using municipality aggregates, we estimate 
the effects without any concern about the potential effects of compositional changes. Consistent 
with our main results, e-prescribing decreases the number of interactions by 19 percent in the long 
run in rural municipalities and the effect is statistically significant. Online Appendix Table A9 
25If we omit the period −Q1 from the sample, the long-run increase is 2 percent in urban regions and 3 percent in 
rural regions, and the latter effect is statistically insignificant (Online Appendix Table A7). Moreover, we have checked 
that the decrease in prescription size is not mechanically caused by the event study design and its normalization. 
The decrease occurs in −Q1 even if we normalize a different period than −Q1 to zero. 
26Our extensive margin results are robust to using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. 
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Figure 10: Intensive and Extensive Margins of Warfarin Prescriptions, by Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
(Panels A–C) and patient-quarter-level balanced data (Panels D–F) on warfarin patients. In Panels A–C, the intensive 
margin outcome is the log number of defined daily doses of warfarin prescriptions, and the data include only warfarin 
prescriptions. In Panels D–F, the extensive margin outcome is the log number of warfarin prescriptions+1 to adjust 
for zeros in the balanced panel. The controls include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, age and age squared. 
The urban/semi-urban and rural classification is from Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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Figure 11: Intensive and Extensive Margins of NSAID Prescriptions, by Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
(panels A–C) and patient-quarter-level balanced data (panels D–F) on warfarin patients. In Panels A–C, the intensive 
margin outcome is the log number of defined daily doses of NSAID prescriptions, and the data include only NSAID 
prescriptions. In Panels D–F, the extensive margin outcome is the log number of NSAID prescriptions+1 to adjust for 
zeros in the balanced panel. The controls include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, age and age squared. 
The urban/semi-urban and rural classification is from Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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additionally confirms that the characteristics of new warfarin patients and their prescriptions look 
fairly similar one year before versus after the adoption of e-prescribing. 
The earlier results indicate that in rural regions the size of warfarin prescription increases while 
the size of NSAID prescription decreases as a result of e-prescribing. Next, we proceed to analyze 
whether the decreasing probability of a harmful interaction originates solely from the decrease in 
the length of NSAID prescription. Any major decreases in the length should not only show up as a 
reduction at the extensive margin of the interacting prescription (our baseline results), but also as a 
reduction at the intensive margin (interaction time). Note that the length of NSAID prescriptions 
does not affect one-way interactions of prescribing NSAIDs on top of warfarin, which decreased 
after e-prescribing (Section 5). 
Online Appendix Figure A15 plots the event study estimates for the number of interacting 
days of each interacting prescription. As the number of observations is quite small, the estimates 
are more imprecisely estimated, but show no clear evidence of a decrease in the outcome. Online 
Appendix Figure A16 shows the density of interaction time separately for the pre-reform period 
and the long-run post-reform period. Again, no discernible differences can be detected between the 
densities. In sum, the decrease in the probability of a harmful interaction is not solely explained 
by the decrease in the length of NSAID prescription. In rural regions, e-prescribing seems to help 
physicians to better target prescription NSAIDs to warfarin users. 
5.4 Effects on Health: Gastrointestinal Bleeding 
The main focus of this paper is to study the effects of information integration on the coordination 
and quality of prescribing. However, it might be of interest to investigate whether improvements 
in coordination translated into improvements in patient health. As a comprehensive analysis of 
various direct and indirect health effects is out of the scope of our paper, we focus on the most 
direct health outcome of interaction of warfarin and NSAID: gastrointestinal bleeding. 
The medical literature has documented that the simultaneous use of NSAIDs and warfarin 
significantly increases the risk of major bleeding complications, especially in the gastrointestinal 
tract (Battistella et al. 2005). We examine whether the e-prescribing-induced decrease in drug 
interactions affected the probability of a gastrointestinal hemorrhage diagnosis in specialized health 
care among warfarin patients, using aggregated patient-quarter-level data. 
We find no evidence of a decrease in this diagnosis after e-prescribing, not even in rural re-
gions (Figure 12 and online Appendix Table A11). This finding can be rationalized by two main 
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Figure 12: Probability of Hemorrhage (Bleeding) Diagnosis, by Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using patient-quarter-level balanced 
data on warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if the patient has a gastrointestinal 
hemorrhage diagnosis in specialized health care in a given period. The controls include municipality fixed effects, 
time fixed effects, age and age squared. The urban/semi-urban and rural classification is from Statistics Finland. 
The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
factors. First, warfarin use by itself can cause excessive bleeding, especially when used in higher 
doses. Moreover, we found that e-prescribing (digitization or easier renewal of prescriptions) in-
creased the number of defined daily doses of warfarin prescriptions in rural regions. The increase in 
bleeding complications stemming from this increased size of warfarin prescriptions may counteract 
the complications stemming from fewer interacting prescriptions.27 Second, our health outcome is 
rare in the patient population (mean quarterly probability of 0.2 percent). Also, not all warfarin 
patients have an interacting prescription in a given quarter. Thus, the bleeding outcome may not 
be sensitive enough to capture the full (long-term) positive effects of the decreased warfarin-NSAID 
interaction risk on latent health. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper studies a large-scale policy of health information integration between different care 
providers, using the rollout of a nationwide e-prescribing system in Finland. The fully digitalized 
system provided a unique opportunity to improve coordination and the quality of prescribing by 
sharing information on prescriptions among all physicians involved in a patient’s care. Comprehen-
sive administrative data on prescriptions for one of the most common and harmful combinations of 
drugs (warfarin and NSAIDs) allow a rare opportunity to analyze the consequences of information 
27Table A11 shows positive and statistically significant effects. Diagnosing bleeding complications is complex (Kim 
et al. 2014), and e-prescribing (improved information on a patient’s prescriptions) may also improve diagnoses, thereby 
increasing their prevalence. 
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and coordination frictions across all regions of the country. 
We observe substantial variation in the quality of prescribing before the adoption of e-prescribing; 
the prevalence of harmful drug combinations varied between 1–19 percent across municipalities. 
The worst performing regions were typically rural, where unspecialized physicians write most of 
the prescriptions. 
We find no evidence that e-prescribing improves the quality of prescribing in urban regions. In 
rural regions, the probability of co-prescribing warfarin with NSAIDs reduces substantially, by ap-
proximately 35 percent. This improvement in the quality of prescribing is driven by unspecialized 
physicians. Our interpretation of this result is that information frictions were higher for unspecial-
ized physicians, which hampered their decision making before e-prescribing. We also find evidence 
of improved care coordination: e-prescribing predominantly reduces interacting prescriptions when 
they are obtained from different physicians, rather than from the same physician. However, the 
resulting direct health benefits seem to be marginal. 
Coordinating care is a major policy challenge for health systems around the world (Doty et al. 
2020). In complex systems such as health care, information is dispersed and the organizational 
structures are decentralized, with decision making allocated to separate agents or providers (e.g. 
by region or speciality). Although decentralization often improves efficiency, it can also lead to 
fragmentation and a breakdown of coordination. As decentralization has been the focus of many 
health systems, much less attention has been paid to optimizing and integrating a patient’s care 
across different providers. Our findings show that a nationwide policy of information integration 
can mitigate coordination failures across different providers, thereby enabling patient medication 
to be tracked efficiently and improving the quality of care. 
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A Online Appendix 
A.1 ATC and ICD-10 codes 
Warfarin and NSAID ATC codes used in the data. 
• Warfarin: B01AA03 
• NSAID: M01AB01, M01AB02, M01AB05, M01AB08, M01AB51, M01AB55, M01AC01, M01AC02, 
M01AC06, M01AE01, M01AE02, M01AE03, M01AE11, M01AE52, M01AG01, M01AG02, 
M01AH01, M01AH05, M01AX01 
ICD-10 codes used for hemorrhage diagnosis in the data. 
• All hemorrhages: I60*, I61*, I62*, K920, K921, K922, I850, K221, K250, K252, K254, K256, 
K260, K262, K264, K266, K270, K272, K274, K276, K280, K282, K284, K286, K290, K625, 
N02*, K661, N938, N939, N950, R041, R042, R048, R049, R31, R58, D683, H356, H431, 
H450, M250 
• Gastrointestinal: K920, K921, K922, I850, K221, K250, K252, K254, K256, K260, K262, 
K264, K266, K270, K272, K274, K276, K280, K282, K284, K286, K290, K625 
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A.2 Figures 
Figure A1: E-Prescribing Technology and Information Integration: Physician’s View 
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Urban
Rural
Figure A2: Regional Classification 
Notes: This figure plots municipality groups (urban/semiurban or rural), according to the classification of Statistics 
Finland. 
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Figure A3: Age Profile of Warfarin Patients 
Notes: The patient’s age is calculated separately for NSAID and warfarin prescriptions from the period of the patient’s 
first prescription for the respective drug in the data. 
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Figure A4: Duration of Warfarin-NSAID Interactions 
Notes: The plot shows the conditional distribution of the duration of each overlapping warfarin and NSAID prescrip-
tion, calculated in days. The length of warfarin and NSAID prescriptions is calculated using the number of defined 
daily doses of each prescription, where one day is assumed to equal one unit of daily dose. Bin width equals 5. 
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Figure A5: Take-up Rate of E-prescriptions, by Physician Speciality 
Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
on warfarin patients. Each line is plotted from a separate regression using data on the corresponding physician 
specializations. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if the prescription is an e-prescription. 
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Figure A6: Probability of Warfarin-NSAID Interaction in Urban and Semi-Urban Municipalities 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data on 
warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with 
another NSAID (warfarin) prescription. The omitted period is −Q1 and thus the coefficient estimates are relative to 
this period. The controls include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, age and age squared. Panel A plots the 
results for the urban municipalities, and Panel B plots for semi-urban municipalities, according to the classification 
by Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Figure A7: Probability of Warfarin-NSAID Interaction With Different Prescribing Physicians, by 
Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data on 
warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with 
another NSAID (warfarin) prescription and the interacting prescriptions are written by different physicians. Panel A 
plots the results for the whole sample of municipalities, Panel B plots for urban and semi-urban municipalities, and 
Panel C plots for rural municipalities, according to the classification by Statistics Finland. See Figure 5 for more 
information on the specification of the model. 
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Figure A8: Probability of Interaction, Additional Robustness Checks to Baseline Results Part 1 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data on 
warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with 
another NSAID (warfarin) prescription. The omitted period is −Q1 and thus the coefficient estimates are relative to 
this period. The controls include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, age and age squared. Panels A, B, and 
C replace municipality fixed effects with patient fixed effects. Panels E, F, and G add interactions of hospital district 
and time fixed effects to the regressions. Panels G, H, and I plot the interaction probability with additional ATC-
code specific linear time-trends added to the regressions. The first, second and third column of the panels plot the 
results using data on all municipalities, urban and semi-urban municipalities, and rural municipalities, respectively, 
according to the classification by Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Figure A9: Probability of Interaction, Additional Robustness Checks to Baseline Results Part 2 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data on 
warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with 
another NSAID (warfarin) prescription. The omitted period is −Q1 and thus the coefficient estimates are relative 
to this period. The controls include municipality fixed effects, time trend fixed effects, age and age squared. Panels 
A, B, and C exclude all observations where the visit was to a private physician. Panels D, E, and F include all 
patients that have an NSAID prescription and that may not have a warfarin prescription during the periods in the 
data. Panels G, H, and I, exclude all patients that died during the periods in the data. The first, second and third 
column of the panels plot the results using data on all municipalities, urban and semi-urban municipalities, and rural 
municipalities, respectively, according to the classification by Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
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Figure A10: Sensitivity Test: Probability of Interaction, 50 Percent Reduction and Increase in 
Prescription Length 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
on warfarin patients where the amount of defined daily doses in prescriptions has decreased by 50 percent. The 
outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with another NSAID 
(warfarin) prescription. The omitted period is −Q1 and thus the coefficient estimates are relative to this period. 
The controls include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, age and age squared. Panel A plots the results 
for the whole sample of municipalities, panel B plots for urban and semi-urban municipalities, and panel C plots for 
rural municipalities, according to the classification by Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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Figure A11: Sensitivity Test: Probability of Interaction, Interactions Under 10 Days and Over 
100 Days Excluded 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data on 
warfarin patients where prescriptions that interact under 10 days are dropped in Panels A, B, and C, and prescriptions 
that interact over 100 days are dropped in Panels D, E, and F. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if 
a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with another NSAID (warfarin) prescription. The omitted period is −Q1 
and thus the coefficient estimates are relative to this period. The controls include municipality fixed effects, time 
fixed effects, age and age squared. The urban/semi-urban and rural classification is from Statistics Finland. The 
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Figure A12: Probability of Warfarin-NSAID Interaction With Average Prescribing Intervals, by 
Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
on warfarin patients. Instead of defined daily doses, the prescription length is proxied by the patient and prescription 
type (warfarin or NSAID) specific average prescribing intervals. Patients that do not have at least two warfarin or 
NSAID prescriptions are dropped. The maximum prescription length is capped at 180 days. The outcome is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with another NSAID (warfarin) prescription. 
The omitted period is −Q1 and thus the coefficient estimates are relative to this period. The controls include 
municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, age and age squared. The urban/semi-urban and rural classification is 
from Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Figure A13: Probability of One-Way Warfarin-NSAID Interaction, By Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
on warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if an NSAID prescription interacts with 
another warfarin prescription. The omitted period is −Q1 and thus the coefficient estimates are relative to this 
period. The controls include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, age and age squared. Panel A plots the 
results for the whole sample of municipalities, Panel B plots for urban and semi-urban municipalities, and Panel C 
plots for rural municipalities, according to the classification by Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
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Figure A14: Placebo: Probability of Warfarin-Benzodiazepine Interaction, by Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
on warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (benzodiazepine) prescription 
interacts with a benzodiazepine (warfarin) prescription. See Figure 5 for more information on the specification of the 
model. 
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Figure A15: Duration of Warfarin-NSAID Interaction, by Municipality Group 
Notes: These figures plot the coefficient estimates from an event study framework using the prescription-level data 
on interacting (wafarin and NSAID) prescriptions for warfarin patients. The outcome is the log number of days that 
the prescription interacts with another prescription. See Figure 5 for more information on the specification of the 
model. 
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Figure A16: Density of Duration of Warfarin-NSAID Interaction 
Notes: The figure plots the conditional density of the duration of each interacting (warfarin or NSAID) prescription, 
calculated in days, separately for the pre-adoption period (before 2010) and the long-run post-adoption period (at 
least one year after adoption). The length of warfarin and NSAID prescriptions are calculated using the number of 
defined daily doses of each prescription, where one day is assumed to equal to one unit of daily dose. 
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A.3 Tables 
Table A1: Prescription Shares by Physician Speciality for Pre-Adoption Period 2007–2009 
All municipalities Urban Rural 
N Share N Share N Share 
Warfarin 
Unspecialized 
General medicine 
Internal medicine 
NSAID 
Unspecialized 
General medicine 
Internal medicine 
Interacting Rx 
Unspecialized 
General medicine 
Internal medicine 
357,114 
171,165 
76,014 
22,346 
127,133 
59,796 
24,272 
4,005 
34,970 
16,178 
6,760 
1,999 
0.74 
0.48 
0.21 
0.06 
0.26 
0.47 
0.19 
0.03 
0.07 
0.46 
0.19 
0.06 
284,006 
130,632 
60,237 
19,183 
98,817 
44,758 
18,361 
3,381 
26,811 
11,987 
4,943 
1,691 
0.74 
0.46 
0.21 
0.07 
0.26 
0.45 
0.19 
0.03 
0.07 
0.45 
0.18 
0.06 
73,108 
40,533 
15,777 
3,163 
28,316 
15,038 
5,911 
624 
8,159 
4,191 
1,817 
308 
0.72 
0.55 
0.22 
0.04 
0.28 
0.53 
0.21 
0.02 
0.08 
0.51 
0.22 
0.04 
Notes: The numbers are based on patients with at least one warfarin prescription in the 
period of 2007–2009. 
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Table A2: Effects of E-prescribing on Warfarin-NSAID Interaction, by Municipalities’ Pre-
adoption Interaction Rate 
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Short-run −0.001 −0.000 −0.005∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ 
Long-run 
Mean outcome 
(0.002) 
−0.001 
(0.003) 
0.035 
(0.002) 
−0.002 
(0.003) 
0.042 
(0.002) 
−0.009∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.049 
(0.004) 
−0.015∗∗ 
(0.006) 
0.065 
Observations 395,028 594,113 505,052 195,313 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Difference-in-Differences regressions using 
the prescription-level data on warfarin patients. The quartiles are based on the munic-
ipalities’ mean warfarin-NSAID interaction probabilites during the pre-adoption period 
of e-prescribing of 2007–2009. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a 
warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with another NSAID (warfarin) prescription. 
Each column is estimated from a separate regression. “Short-run” refers to the first 
three quarters after adoption, and “Long-run” refers to all subsequent quarters. All re-
gressions control for time and municipality fixed effects, patient’s age, and square of age. 
The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
Table A3: Effects of E-prescribing on Warfarin-NSAID Interaction With Average Prescribing 
Intervals, by Municipality Group 
All municipalities 
(1) 
Urban 
(2) 
Rural 
(3) 
Short-run 0.002 0.003 −0.006 
Long-run 
Mean outcome 
(0.004) 
−0.001 
(0.007) 
0.083 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.080 
(0.008) 
−0.031∗∗∗ 
(0.011) 
0.092 
Observations 444,111 355,071 89,040 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Difference-in-Differences 
regressions using the prescription-level data on warfarin patients. In-
stead of defined daily doses, the prescription length is proxied by the 
patient and prescription type (warfarin or NSAID) specific average pre-
scribing intervals. Patients that do not have at least two warfarin or 
NSAID prescriptions are dropped. The maximum prescription length 
is capped at 180 days. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals 
one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with another NSAID 
(warfarin) prescription. “Short-run” refers to the first year after adop-
tion, and “Long-run” refers to all subsequent periods. Each column 
is estimated from a separate regression. All specifications include mu-
nicipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, and age and age squared. 
The urban/semi-urban and rural classification in the columns is from 
Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered at the municipal-
ity level. 
52 
Table A4: Effects of E-prescribing on Warfarin-NSAID Interaction, by Municipality Group and 
Physician Specialty 
All municipalities Urban Rural 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Unspecialized 
Short-run −0.002 0.000 −0.012∗∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Long-run −0.004∗ −0.001 −0.018∗∗∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Mean outcome 0.043 0.042 0.047 
Observations 917,214 709,548 207,666 
Panel B. General medicine 
Short-run −0.003 −0.002 −0.008 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Long-run −0.004 −0.002 −0.010 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
Mean outcome 0.040 0.038 0.049 
Observations 337,702 266,726 70,976 
Panel C. Internal medicine 
Short-run −0.001 0.001 −0.023 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.015) 
Long-run 0.001 0.004 −0.030 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.024) 
Mean outcome 0.056 0.055 0.063 
Observations 73,862 63,477 10,385 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Difference-in-Differences 
regressions using the prescription-level data on warfarin patients. The 
outcome is a dummy variable that equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) 
prescription interacts with another NSAID (warfarin) prescription. 
“Short-run” refers to the first year after adoption, and “Long-run” 
refers to all subsequent periods. Each panel-column combination is 
estimated from a separate regression. All specifications include munic-
ipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, and age and age squared. Panel 
A uses prescriptions written by physicians without any specialization, 
Panel B by physicians specialized in general medicine, and Panel C 
by physicians specialized in internal medicine. The urban/semi-urban 
and rural classification in the columns is from Statistics Finland. The 
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table A5: Effects of E-prescribing on Warfarin-NSAID Interaction, Different Versus Same pre-
scribing Physician 
All municipalities Urban Rural 
(1) (2) (3) 
Short-run × same physician 0.000 0.001 −0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Long-run × same physician 0.000 0.001 −0.004∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Short-run × different physician −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.008∗∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Long-run × different physician −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.009∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Difference-in-Differences regressions using 
the prescription-level data on warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a warfarin (NSAID) prescription interacts with another NSAID (warfarin) 
prescription. “Short-run × same physician” and “Long-run × same physician” refer to the 
interaction between drug interactions where the prescribing physician is the same as the 
previous prescribing physician and, respectively, the first year after adoption and all subse-
quent periods after adoption. “Short-run × different physician” and “Long-run × different 
physician” refer to the same interactions but when the interacting prescription is written 
by a different physician than the prescriber of the underlying prescription. The coefficients 
for different physician are estimated relative to the coefficients of same physician, meaning 
that the total effect for different physician is the sum of coefficients of same physician and 
different physician. Each column is estimated from a separate regression. All specifica-
tions include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, and age and age squared. The 
urban/semi-urban and rural classification in the columns is from Statistics Finland. The 
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table A6: Intensive and Extensive Margins of Warfarin Prescriptions, by Municipality Group 
All municipalities Urban Rural 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Intensive margin: Log warfarin DDDs 
Short-run 0.018∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.029∗∗ 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) 
Long-run 0.038∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.023) 
Mean outcome 140.086 140.548 138.234 
Observations 1,050,380 840,392 209,988 
Panel B. Extensive margin: Log warfarin prescriptions 
Short-run 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Long-run 0.002∗ 0.001 0.005 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Mean outcome 3.103 3.102 3.107 
Observations 7,422,752 5,952,632 1,470,120 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Difference-in-Differences 
regressions using the prescription-level data in Panel A and patient-
quarter-level balanced data in panel B on warfarin patients. In Panel 
A the outcome is the log number of defined daily doses of warfarin pre-
scriptions, and the data include only warfarin prescriptions. In Panel 
B, the outcome is the log number of warfarin prescriptions+1 to ad-
just for zeros in the balanced panel. “Short-run” refers to the first year 
after adoption, and “Long-run” refers to all subsequent periods. Each 
panel-column combination is estimated from a separate regression. All 
specifications include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, and 
age and age squared. The urban/semi-urban and rural classification in 
the columns is from Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
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Table A7: Intensive Margin of Warfarin Prescriptions Without −Q1, by Municipality Group 
All municipalities 
(1) 
Urban 
(2) 
Rural 
(3) 
Short-run 0.003 0.002 0.007 
Long-run 
Mean outcome 
(0.006) 
0.021∗ 
(0.011) 
139.921 
(0.007) 
0.021∗ 
(0.012) 
140.369 
(0.015) 
0.030 
(0.025) 
138.129 
Observations 1,015,591 812,526 203,065 
Notes: This table shows the intensive margin results for warfarin pre-
scriptions with the first pre-quarter of e-prescribing, −Q1, dropped 
from the data. See Table A6 for more information on the specifica-
tion. 
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Table A8: Intensive and Extensive Margins of NSAID Prescriptions, by Municipality Group 
All municipalities Urban Rural 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Intensive margin: Log NSAID DDDs 
Short-run 0.000 0.003 −0.013 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) 
Long-run −0.008 0.000 −0.046 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.034) 
Mean outcome 53.036 52.607 54.677 
Observations 639,126 506,806 132,320 
Panel B. Extensive margin: Log NSAID prescriptions 
Short-run 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Long-run 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Mean outcome 2.952 2.950 2.963 
Observations 7,422,752 5,952,632 1,470,120 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Difference-in-Differences 
regressions using the prescription-level data in Panel A and patient-
quarter-level balanced data in Panel B on warfarin patients. In Panel 
A the outcome is the log number of defined daily doses of NSAID pre-
scriptions, and the data include only NSAID prescriptions. In Panel 
B, the outcome is the log number of NSAID prescriptions+1 to adjust 
for zeros in the balanced panel. “Short-run” refers to the first year af-
ter adoption, and “Long-run” refers to all subsequent periods. Each 
panel-column combination is estimated from a separate regression. All 
specifications include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, and 
age and age squared. The urban/semi-urban and rural classification in 
the columns is from Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
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Table A9: Summary Statistics for New Patients in Pre- and Post-Adoption Years 
Urban Rural 
Pre-adoption Post-adoption Pre-adoption Post-adoption 
Warfarin DDDs per patient 181.008 188.077 176.905 185.715 
(120.254) (123.949) (119.651) (117.267) 
Warfarin Rx per patient 1.510 1.482 1.502 1.450 
(0.748) (0.702) (0.769) (0.702) 
DDDs in first warfarin Rx 118.017 121.372 119.025 123.918 
(79.547) (83.033) (83.252) (83.256) 
NSAID DDDs per patient 18.913 18.244 20.896 19.701 
(51.600) (51.985) (56.474) (56.687) 
NSAID Rx per patient 0.390 0.363 0.413 0.363 
(0.815) (0.799) (0.899) (0.809) 
DDDs in first NSAID Rx 12.778 12.372 12.952 12.885 
(32.895) (31.826) (33.475) (34.660) 
Share of Rx by specialty 
Unspecialized 0.568 0.603 0.631 0.668 
(0.425) (0.422) (0.419) (0.408) 
General medicine 0.118 0.126 0.139 0.139 
(0.268) (0.279) (0.295) (0.295) 
Internal medicine 0.069 0.070 0.060 0.051 
(0.223) (0.225) (0.206) (0.196) 
Age 67.750 68.463 70.206 70.684 
(14.698) (14.545) (13.665) (13.403) 
Number of new patients 17,736 17,735 4,176 4,274 
Notes: Mean values are taken over per patient values. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 
The table includes only those patients who have their first warfarin prescription either during the year 
right before or during the year right after the adoption of e-prescribing. The time of the patient’s first 
warfarin prescription is defined as the first time a warfarin prescription is observed for the patient in 
the data. The urban/semi-urban and rural classification in the columns is from Statistics Finland. 
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Table A10: Extensive Margin of Warfarin Use and Interactions in Municipality 
All municipalities Urban Rural 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Log number of new patients 
Short-run 0.007 −0.013 0.019 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.034) 
Long-run 0.018 −0.001 0.027 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.050) 
Observations 7,296 2,904 4,392 
Adjusted R2 0.872 0.921 0.572 
Panel B. Log number of warfarin prescriptions 
Short-run 0.032∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.033 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.025) 
Long-run 0.050∗ 0.034 0.056 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.041) 
Observations 7,296 2,904 4,392 
Adjusted R2 0.945 0.972 0.827 
Panel C. Log number of interactions 
Short-run −0.054∗∗ 0.040 −0.124∗∗∗ 
(0.027) (0.038) (0.035) 
Long-run −0.056 0.126∗ −0.188∗∗∗ 
(0.044) (0.069) (0.055) 
Observations 9,728 3,872 5,856 
Adjusted R2 0.727 0.776 0.419 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Difference-in-Differences 
regressions using municipality-quarter-level balanced data. In Panel A, 
the outcome is the log number of new warfarin patients. New patients 
are defined as those patients that have their first warfarin prescription in 
a given quarter in the data. In Panel B, the outcome is the log number 
of overall warfarin prescriptions in the municipality. In Panel C, the out-
come is the log number of warfarin-NSAID interactions. In Panels A and 
B, because of left-censoring, those patients that have their first warfarin 
prescription in 2007–2009 are dropped and only data from the years 2009– 
2017 are used in the regressions. “Short-run” refers to the first year after 
adoption, and “Long-run” refers to all subsequent periods. All regressions 
include fixed effects for municipality and time trend. All regressions are 
weighted by the population size in the municipality. The urban/semi-
urban and rural classification in the columns is from Statistics Finland. 
The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
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Table A11: Effects of E-prescribing on Gastrointestinal Bleeding Diagnosis 
All municipalities Urban Rural 
(1) (2) (3) 
Short-run 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ 0.0005∗ 
Long-run 
Mean outcome 
(0.0001) 
0.0004∗∗∗ 
(0.0001) 
0.0020 
(0.0001) 
0.0003∗∗ 
(0.0001) 
0.0020 
(0.0003) 
0.0007∗∗ 
(0.0003) 
0.0021 
Observations 7,361,632 5,920,658 1,440,974 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates from Difference-in-
Differences regressions using patient-quarter-level balanced data from 
warfarin patients. The outcome is a dummy variable that equals to one 
if the patient has a gastrointestinal hemorrhage diagnosis in specialized 
health care in a given period. All regressions include municipality fixed 
effects, time fixed effects, age and age squared. The urban/semi-urban 
and rural classification in the columns is from Statistics Finland. The 
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
B Early Versus Later Treated Municipalities 
Goodman-Bacon (2018) shows that, in the case of a staggered adoption of policy where the treat-
ment occurs at different times across units, the two-way fixed effects DiD estimator is a weighted 
average of all possible individual two-period/two-group DiD estimators in the data. In the case of 
dynamic treatment effects, this could induce negative weights to later-treated groups as these units 
are compared to already-treated units. 
We follow Goodman-Bacon (2018) to examine the potential bias in the overall DiD estimates on 
the quality of prescribing from the later-treated municipalities. Specifically, we perform an explicit 
decomposition of the summed weights and average DiD estimates for early- versus later-treated 
municipalities and later- versus early-treated municipalities. The shortcoming of this approach is 
that as such it does not allow us to partition the treatment effect into short- and long-run effects as 
in our main analysis.28 To reduce the computational burden, as we have to compute all two-by-two 
DiD estimates separately for each municipality group (urban and rural) and adoption time, we 
use aggregated municipality-quarter level data and the log number of warfarin-NSAID interactions 
as an outcome. Thus, the estimates are not fully comparable to our baseline estimates obtained 
from the prescription-level data, but the results should give an idea of whether using early-treated 
28Another shortcoming is that the approach does not allow for weights in the regressions when doing the full 
decomposition. 
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municipalities as a control group is worrisome in our setting. 
The results for the municipality-level DiD estimates and the decompositions beneath them are 
shown in Tables A12. We find that the number of warfarin-NSAID interactions decreases by 14 
percent in rural municipalities and there is no statistically significant effect in urban municipalities. 
Based on the decompositions, we conclude that negative weighting is not a major issue, especially 
in rural municipalities. Albeit not fully comparable, our conclusions regarding the effects of e-
prescribing based on the aggregated data remain fairly similar to those drawn from our baseline 
estimates using the prescription-level data. 
Table A12: Goodman-Bacon Analysis on the Number of Interactions in Municipality 
All municipalities Urban Rural 
(1) (2) (3) 
DiD −0.066∗∗ 0.031 −0.140∗∗∗ 
(0.029) (0.034) (0.042) 
Observations 9,728 3,872 5,856 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.823 0.502 
Earlier vs. Later (Weight × DiD) 0.693×-0.064 0.686×0.054 0.698×-0.149 
Later vs. Earlier (Weight × DiD) 0.307×-0.071 0.314×-0.019 0.302×-0.119 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from Difference-in-Differences regressions using municipality-
quarter-level balanced data. The outcome is the log number of interactions in the municipality. ”DiD” 
is the binary variable for the treatment effect and it gets the value of one after the municipality gets 
treated. “Earlier vs. Later” and “Later vs. Earlier” show the summed weights and the average DiD 
coefficients from all two-by-two decompositions of earlier and later adopting municipalities, respectively. 
All regressions include municipality fixed effects and time fixed effects. The urban/semi-urban and 
rural classification in the columns is from Statistics Finland. The standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
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